Using intraday data, we assess the impact of monetary news on the full length of the euro-area yield curve. We find that the publication of monetary data has a significant impact on interest rates with maturities ranging from one to ten years, with the largest effect on the one-to five-year segment. These results suggest that when gauging the policy-relevant signals, market participants look through short-term movements of annual M3 growth and focus instead on the trend rate of monetary expansion over the medium term.
INTRODUCTION
The monetary policy strategy of the European Central Bank (ECB) assigns a prominent role to money. This strategy differentiates monetary analysis from economic analysis, and refers to each of them as a 'pillar' for the overall assessment of risks to price stability. However, many observers have failed to detect any relationship between the growth rate of M3 and the subsequent ECB monetary policy decisions, as noted for instance by Issing (2005) . 1 Hence, they have argued that the ECB did not give much weight to monetary analysis.
To assess the outreach of this criticism and evaluate to which extent the 'monetary pillar approach' remains credible, we propose to analyse the reaction of the interest rate yield curve to the press release on monetary developments. If the reaction proved significant on the short end of the yield 1. 'Critical central bank watchers at these conferences and beyond argued that the monetary pillar did not provide any useful information for our monetary policy decisions, and was therefore superfluous'. Otmar Issing, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, speech given at the Conference entitled 'The ECB and Its Watchers VII ', Frankfurt, 3 June 2005. curve, it would mean that monetary growth is considered -at least by market operators -as informative about the future monetary policy stance. If not, given the long-run relationship between money and prices, one can expect a change in medium-and long-run inflation, driving a reaction at the long end of the yield curve. The last possible scenario is an absence of reaction of the whole yield curve to monetary developments, which could reflect the scepticism of market operators on the link between money growth and inflation. 2 To assess the impact of macroeconomic news on financial markets, a strand of the recent literature has analysed high-frequency financial data. By investigating changes in financial prices within a narrow time window surrounding an announcement, the impact of that announcement can be easily disentangled from the effects of other data releases on that particular day. Following the initial work of Fleming and Remolona (1997, pp. 31, 34) , the number of studies using such a technique has inflated and spans across asset classes and types of data releases. 3 Yet, we do not know of any economic study in which the central topic is the impact of monetary news on the full length of the yield curve. Balduzzi et al. (2001, pp. 523, 527) tested the effects of 26 data releases on the intraday price of US Treasury bonds, but they did so for the American market only. They found a statistical significance for 17 data releases, including that of the monetary aggregate M2. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005, pp. 928, 929, 942) studied the impact of monetary news on the European market, but they used daily data only and focused on the short end of the yield curve. They found an impact of M3 releases for Germany from 1992 to 1998 and for the euro area from 1999 to 2002, especially at the end of the sample. As for the long end of the yield curve, Andersson et al. (2009, pp. 4, 13, 14, 21, 31) explored the impact of several major macroeconomic releases -including M3 -on German long-term bond futures contracts, with an intraday spanning 1999-2005. The effect of M3 news is found poorly significant.
Our purpose is to extend the latter analysis to the full length of the yield curve. The dataset is somewhat different, as we wanted to have a satisfactory homogeneity of the yield curve, from the one-month to the ten-year maturities. Hence, interest rates are derived from the interest rate swap market rather than from the German bond market. Following the standard methodology, the monetary news is measured as the difference between the actual M3 growth and expectations given by Bloomberg. As the IFO index is sometimes released exactly at the same time as the monetary data, the assessment of the impact of the monetary data on the interest rates is controlled by the IFO.
Our findings vary across maturities. On the short end of the yield curve, interest rates with maturities up to six months do not react to the press release on monetary developments. By contrast, the publication of the monetary data has a statistically significant impact on interest rates with maturities ranging from one to ten years, with the largest effect on the one-to two-year segment. However, there is evidence that this reaction may have changed over time, becoming non-linear and more conditional on the other economic events.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 elaborates on the econometric methodology used in the study. Section 3 presents the main results, Section 4 proposes some interpretations and Section 5 concludes.
THE MODEL
The press release on monetary developments is issued the 19th open day of every month, at 10:00 am. A measurement of the market reaction has been constructed as the change in interest rates on these days, between 9:55 and 10:15 am. Considering the existing literature, a time window of 20 minutes is considered short enough to avoid any contamination by other events but long enough to allow market participants to digest the new information and update (Balduzzi et al., 2001, pp. 524, 532, 533, 538; Bentzen et al., 2004, pp. 2, 17, 18) . As the IFO index on business confidence is, on occasion, also released at 10:00 am on the same day as that of the monetary data, the exercise presented below controls for the impact of its announcement. 4 Therefore, the 4. Only few major macroeconomic news are released at 10:00 CET. Apart from M3 and the German IFO, they are the Euro Area Purchasing Managers' Indexes -issued between the first and the sixth of each month -the German Unemployment -also released at the beginning of the month -and, only from 2005, some Italian data, especially the Industrial Producer Price Index, the Retail Trade Turnover and Foreign Trade. In our dataset, the Italian Retail Trade Turnover was released on four occasions on the same time as IFO (23/02/05, 30/03/05, 24/11/05 and 25/01/06) while data on Italian Foreign trade once (16/12/05). Their impacts have not been controlled because they were assessed as much less market moving than the German IFO. Italian Producer Price Index was released on the same time as M3 on five occasions (30/03/05, 28/07/05, 29/11/05, 29/12/05 and 28/04/06), but in every case, the move of the market is not significant and the impact of the released data very implausible. This is confirmed by the literature, including Andersson et al. (2009) , who find no statistical significant impact of the Italian Industrial Price Index. Lastly, we have to mention that on 28 March 2006, the first set of aggregates of the Italian National Account has been released at the same time as both IFO and M3. On this day, the move on the market was strong, but commented by the market operators and journalists as caused by the big surprise in the IFO index release (2.6, i.e. more than two standard deviations). Consequently, on the time window 9:55-10:15 am, M3 press release has been controlled only by the German IFO index release.
following regression (1) has been successively carried out for maturities of two weeks, one, two, three and six months, one, two, five and ten years:
The components of the regression are described in Table 1 . 5 The estimation is carried out using ordinary least squares with t-statistics corrected for slight heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the residuals using the Newey-West procedure. 6 Table 1 Description of the variables Di 9:55 À 10: 15,t Interest-rate change surrounding an M3 release or an IFO release at the date t. a The interest rates consist of real-time quotes of swap rates from Reuters. The change is the difference between the interest rate quote at time 10:15 am and the interest rate quote at time 9:55 am. Di 9:35 À 9:55,t Lagged endogenous variable. SM t and SIFO t Surprises in M3 growth and in the IFO index. SM t (resp. SIFO t ) is constructed as the difference between the M3 growth outturn (resp. the IFO outcome) and the mean forecast of M3 (resp. the mean forecast of IFO) reported in the regular Bloomberg survey of market participants. SM t 5 0 (resp. SIFO t 5 0) on days when the IFO (resp. M3) alone is published. SM t À 1 and SIFO t À 1
Surprises of the previous month. b
Volatility Standard deviation of five-minute quotations over the time window 9:30-9:55 am.
Direction
Dummy capturing whether the surprise in the previous month went in the same direction as that of the current month.
Friday
Dummy variable taking into account end-of-the-week effects. c c Constant. We present here the results of the most significant day-of-the-week dummy variables, which is Friday.
5.
A complete description of the data is also available in the ECB Working Paper No. 792 (Coffinet and Gouteron, 2007, pp. 10-14) . 6. On the sake of simplicity, our regression is rather crude in the sense that we do not include any modelization of the heteroscedasticity such as the GARCH model (Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2005) or weighted least squares (WLS) estimation (Andersson et al., 2009 ). This 
Central scenario
For our central scenario, i.e. a time window spanning 9:55-10:15 am with news built with mean expectations, several explanatory variables prove to be statistically non-significant. As expected in the absence of deterministic trend in interest rates, the constant is found null in the estimation of equation (1) and is therefore removed from subsequent estimates ( Table 2) .
Estimating equation (1) without the constant leads to the following results (Table 3) :
the volatility, the Friday and Direction dummies are not statistically significant; at the noticeable exception of the ten-year interest rates, the lagged values of SM t and SIFO t are also not statistically significant. As for the ten-year rates, the impact of the money news is slightly revised upward and, thereby, the broad picture of a significant effect of M3 press release on financial markets is not modified. Furthermore, when removing the variables one-by-one, keeping in the right-hand side of equation (1) only SM t , SIFO t and SIFO t À 1 , the latter proves to be non-significant. Also, the lagged endogenous variable Di 9:35 À 9:55,t proves to be statistically non-significant (Table 4) .
Therefore, we re-estimate a simple equation (2) using the same procedure:
In terms of the economic significance or magnitude of these effects, prima facie the impact of M3 surprises on market interest rates appears rather modest. An M3 surprise of 0.4 pp (one standard deviation) implies an interest rate change ranging from 0.2 bp (for the ten-year maturity) to 0.5 bp (for the one-and two-year maturities). However, the impact of M3 surprises on interest rates is broadly comparable to that of the IFO surprises, at least at the one-and two-year maturities. Moreover, although these regressions explain, at best, only about one-third of the variance of the interest rate change in the time window considered (cf. R 2 values), their performance in this respect is broadly comparable to other estimates in the literature (Balduzzi et al., 2001, p. 530 ). An interesting feature of these results is the absence of significant reaction of maturities inferior to one year. Conversely, the maximum impact is noted choice is motivated by the fact that we do not want to impose any structural form to the volatility. In addition, the WLS estimation is not so appropriate in our case because we focus on only two explanatory variables and, thus, on their release dates specifically. In order to take into account volatility and heteroscedasticity without complexifying the estimation, a variable 'vol' is included in the regression and the Newey-West correction is applied. The subsequent residuals are satisfactory.
for the medium segment of the yield curve, i.e. one to five years, which is in line with the results of Fleming and Remolona (1999, pp. 3, 8) . On the long end of the yield curve, the impact is dampened but still significant. Therefore, these results are broadly in compliance with the long-run relationship between money and prices, even if the segment that is the most affected, i.e. the one to five years, is somewhat shorter than expected.
Robustness checks
This section presents three robustness checks: first, a modification of the length of the time window surrounding the M3 news; second, a re-estimation of the central scenario replacing the mean forecast by the median forecast; and third, the use of an alternative dataset, as the swap market may appear insufficiently liquid for certain maturities and certain periods.
Modifying the time window
The same exercises carried out with different time windows do not alter the results. Even on the window 9:55-10:05 am, the impact of the press release is statistically significant. This impact (coefficient a) rises with the length of the time window and reaches a maximum at 10:10 or 10:15 am, depending on the observed maturity. After 10:15 am, there is a stabilization or, on occasion, a slight dampening that reflects an initial 'overshooting' of the market operators. Surprisingly, this overshooting is more pronounced for M3 than for IFO. An explanation could be that the market operators need more time to analyse the content in information of the M3 press release, more complex and richer in information than that of the IFO press release. This is consistent with an effect of the IFO release, which is also more immediate than that of the M3 press release, as illustrated by the move in the window 9:55-10:05 am, which are for IFO, close to the equilibrium (Table 5 ).
Taking the median instead of the mean
To check the robustness of the exercise, a surprise has also been constructed with the median forecast. It is usually the same as the mean forecast, being liable to differ from it only by 0.1 percentage point in one-third of the cases. The choice between mean and median has no impact on the results (Table 6) .
Replacing the swap rates dataset by a bond futures rates dataset
As mentioned above, the dataset we used -interest rates swap -has been chosen because it offers a good homogeneity from two-week to ten-year maturities. The fact that the biggest moves are concentrated in the subsample December 2000-September 2001 is fully consistent with the results of Brand et al. (2006, pp. 16, 27) , who used the same dataset. However, one can argue that for precise maturities, such as ten years, the liquidity of the interest-rate swap market (an over-the-counter market) is weaker than that of other markets, especially the future market (an organized market). Thus, in order to crosscheck the results we obtained with the 'swap' dataset, equation (2) has been estimated for two, five and ten years, with an alternative intraday dataset, the Eurex futures on German bonds. As shown in Table 7 , the results are extremely close to those we obtained with the 'swap dataset', confirming them fully.
VARIATION OVER TIME
The reaction of interest rates to monetary developments is likely to change over time. Thus, we carry out the same regression as in equation (2) on the six-month, two-year and ten-year maturities with a one-year rolling window. 7 The results are presented on Charts 1, 2 and 3 (the date in the 7. There is no consensus in the literature how to gauge accurately the time-varying feature of macro and monetary policy announcements. Some authors use regression analysis in a rolling window (Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2005) , whereas others prefer to divide the sample in several ad hoc subsamples (Andersson et al., 2009 ). In the present study, we use a rolling regression with a one-year window. The coefficients are estimated with the same methodology as in Section 3, but we have included a constant in equation (2) given that interest rates are not assumed to be trend stationary over the one-year window. horizontal axis indicates the end of the one-year subsample). For all maturities, the reaction to monetary developments has faded over time in terms of both magnitude and significance. However, the pattern varies across the yield curve.
The short end of the yield curve: one-to six-month rates
It is apparent that -especially from the summer of 2001 -the dispersion of the changes has declined. Short-term rates do not react to the M3 press release, or do so to only a very modest extent. The last substantial reaction occurred in June 2001. Actually, several events can be put forward to explain a fading role of M3 in the eyes of market operators:
First, in spring 2001, monetary policy expectations based on the latest M3 developments were disappointed. As a matter of fact, in April 2001, a þ 0.5 pp surprise in M3 growth was recorded (with annual M3 growth Third, from 2006 the use of 'code words' in the Press Conference following the Governing Council -more precisely, the use of words that the market operators interpret as signals of a future rise in key interest rates -could have anchored the expectations and underplayed for the market the weight of the monetary developments. However, this phenomenon could occur only at the very end of the sample.
4.2. The medium-term segment of the yield curve: one-to five-year rates M3 surprises have a statistically significant impact on interest rates at one-to five-year maturities, with the magnitude of the impact decreasing with maturity ( The results obtained are thus a confirmation of those exhibited by Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005, pp. 941, 942) , who found a significant reaction of the one-year interest rate to M3 growth for the end of their sample, i.e. the period 2001-02. However, when extending this period up to 2007, the reaction tends to fade over. Interestingly, the period when the reaction is null, basically years 2003-05, corresponds to years when monetary policy expectations have disappeared. By contrast, in summer 2002 and in the beginning of 2007, when interest rates are reacting to M3 growth, monetary policy expectations are taking place. Therefore, one can take the view that market operators pay attention to M3 in those precise moments when economic environment makes changes in key interest rates possible. In other words, the bivariate relationship between M3 surprises and interest rate changes is probably non-linear and, more specifically, conditional on the other economic events. 9 4.3. The long-term segment of the yield curve: ten-year rates M3 surprises have a statistically significant impact on the ten-year interest rate, although the magnitude of the reaction is smaller than that of the oneto five-year rates (see Table 3 ). Broadly speaking, the pattern of responses over time is similar (Chart 3). 10 8. The strong reaction of March 2006 is not due to M3 but to a strong IFO surprise (2.6, i.e. more than two standard deviations). 9. For instance, Hautsch and Hess (2002) find that 'bad' news creates more uncertainty among traders than 'good' news (asymmetric impact). Andersen et al. (2007) show that equity markets react differently to the same news depending on the state of the US economy. 10. To cross-check this pattern, a rolling regression with the alternative dataset (German bond futures) has also been carried out.
The dampened responses of ten-year rates to M3 surprises -and more generally, the fading response over maturities -suggest that market participants are confident that the ECB will act in a manner that stabilizes longer-term inflation expectations and secures price stability over the medium term. In this respect, it has to be borne in mind that while actual and expected 11 inflations are slightly above the threshold of 2% on our sample -the objective of the ECB is to be below in a medium term -the volatility of both actual annual growth rate of inflation in average on one year and expected annual growth rate of inflation in a long run (ten years) is extremely low, much lower for instance than the volatility of actual GDP growth or that of the expected potential growth. Therefore, considering that the long-term interest rate on safe bonds is the sum of expected growth and expected inflation, the difficulty for an operator is essentially to assess expected growth. Thus, it is logical to observe only a slight impact of the M3 press release on the long-term maturities.
Of course, this interpretation should be taken with a grain of caution, since the impact of all macroeconomic news tend to fade on the long end of the yield curve, as shown for instance by Balduzzi et al. (2001, p. 531) and Fleming and Remolona (1999, p. 11) . The traditional explanation is that the longer the maturity, the higher the uncertainty. But we also think that in the case of most macroeconomic news, the credibility of the authorities might play a role.
CONCLUSION
Our results suggest that the 'surprise' component of the monetary developments prompts a significant response in the yield curve, but only on the medium and possibly longer maturities, while the short end of the yield curve does not significantly react to M3 news.
These results may appear not so surprising as far as the communication of the ECB has been to emphasize on the low-frequency signal contained in monetary developments. Viewed in this light, one would not expect the month-to-month 'news' in headline M3 growth to have much influence on short-term rates. One would rather expect an impact on the medium and long part of the yield curve, as the monetary developments are considered by the Eurosystem as containing information for price stability over the medium and longer term.
The strong amplitude of the reaction on the medium-term segment, even comparable to that of IFO, shows that in spite of criticisms, monetary analysis is not seen by market operators as a purely rhetorical exercise. While the latter seem to attach less importance to monetary analysis than before, they still continue to consider that, on medium term, it contributes significantly to the actual interest rate decisions. 11. Expected inflation is derived from the French inflation-linked bonds (OAT indexées sur l'inflation). 
